



# Deploying DNSSEC

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
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
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## What's recursion, anyway?

- DNS queries are either recursive or nonrecursive
- A recursive query asks the name server to do whatever work is necessary to find the answer, including sending additional queries



- How do you get that many guesses at the right message ID?




- **The longer-term fix to cache poisoning is DNSSEC, the DNS Security Extensions**
  - Developed within the Internet community's standards process
  - Completely backwards compatible (traditional DNS unaffected)
  - Designed to add source authentication and integrity checking to DNS
    - Using digital signatures (much like digital certificates)
  - DNS data will have digital signatures
    - Parent zones (e.g., .org, .com) will state security status of child subzones (e.g., example.org)
    - Even up to the root
  - Not a perfect solution
    - Does not protect against Denial of Service Attacks
    - Only protects the data, not the quality of the data


## ▪ **How DNSSEC works – some details**

- DNSSEC adds source authentication and integrity checking to DNS
  - Using digital signatures (asymmetric cryptography), such as RSA
- Each signed zone has two key pairs
  - A Zone-Signing Key pair, used to sign data in the zone
  - A Key-Signing Key pair, used to sign the zone's public keys
  - Each pair consists of a public and a private key
- Each RRset in a signed zone is signed with RRSIG records
- The zone's public keys are published in DNSKEY records
- The zone's Key-Signing Key is signed by the parent zone's private key
  - Establishing a “chain of trust” from the root to any zone
- When a DNSSEC-capable recursive name server queries the name servers for the signed zone, they return RRSIG and DNSKEY records that enable the recursive

- **Here, foo.org. has a secure delegation from .org.**
  - Assume that the client has the KSK for .org pre-configured (in black)
  - Using it, the client can trust the ZSK of .org (in orange)
  - The foo.org KSK has a matching DS RR in .org (blue text)
  - .org signs a hash of foo.org's KSK, so if .org is trusted, the client can trust foo.org's key
  - client can then use newly discovered key (foo.org's KSK) to validate data in foo.org.
  - Like all DNS data, DNSKEYs are cached (future validation is quicker)



CDF of DNSSEC zones



## Performance. Security. Availability.



- ✓ 1U, rack mountable
- ✓ Hot swappable, field replaceable, redundant AC and DC power supplies
- ✓ LAN1, LAN2, MGMT and HA ports

### High Performance

- Custom built, high performance architecture
- 110,000 DNS QPS
- Easy to scale using load sharing with DNS Anycast
- Runs standard NIOS software & supports all standard NIOS features (DNS, DHCP, IPAM, Grid, etc.)

### Low TCO

- Central system and data management
- Lower deployment and management costs
- No separate security products required
- Fewer appliances required
- Clear escalation line to 24/7 TAC


### Highly Secure

- Secure appliance with hardened OS
- DNS attack monitoring, reporting and mitigation built-in
- One-click system-wide upgrades for quick vulnerability patching
- Vendor alerts for all DNS issues
- HSM support

### Highly Reliable

- Built-in redundant fans and Power Supplies
- Hardware HA based on VRRP
- DR for central management
- Automatic healing mechanisms built-in

- **Unified Web 2.0 UI**
- **Manages \*all\* aspects of the solution**
  - DNS
  - DHCP
  - IPAM
  - Grid
  - Device configuration, ...
- **Benefits**
  - **No need for using command-line tools and client programs**
  - Easy learning curve
  - Reduced management overhead
  - Reduced configuration errors






# Live Demo




# Centralized Configuration of All DNSSEC Parameters on All Name Servers


- **Administrators can implement organizational standards by configuring DNSSEC parameters at the Grid level**
  - Default key algorithm, key size and rollover period for both ZSK and KSK
    - Defaults based on NIST 800-81 recommendations
  - Settings inherited by all zones
    - Can be overridden per zone
- **NSEC3 support included**
- **Administrators can configure trust anchors at the Grid level**
  - Configuration inherited by all Grid members




- **Single click to enable DNSSEC**
- **Single click to enable DNSSEC validation of records for an external zone**
- **Trust anchor configuration inherited from Grid level**
  - Administrator can also override at member (name server) level



- **Any zone can be signed with a single click by using the “Sign Zone” toolbar button**
  - Keys are generated on the fly and records are automatically signed
  - Auto-creation of all associated DNSSEC records
- **Automatic maintenance of signed zones**
  - ZSK rollover is handled automatically
  - DNSSEC zones automatically resigned when zone data is modified



- **Signed zones are identified with the DNSSEC icon**
  - The following record types are supported: DNSKEY, RRSIG, DS, NSEC, NSEC3, NSEC3PARAM
- **New Zone Signing Keys are automatically generated when the current keys are due to be rolled over**
  - Key rollover is transparent to the admin
- **Admins are automatically notified in the GUI when KSK rollover is required**
  - Initiating KSK rollover only requires single click



The screenshot shows the Infoblox DNS management interface. At the top, there are tabs for 'Zones', 'Members', 'Name Server Groups', and 'Shared Record Groups'. Below the tabs, the breadcrumb 'DNS Home > default' is visible. The main area shows the zone 'foo.example' with a 'DNSSEC' icon. Below this, there is a 'Records' section with a 'Go to' search box and a 'Go' button. A table of records is displayed below the search box.

Name	Type	Data
	DNSKEY Record	1296000 257 3 5 AwEAAb5hOKn2XNEzZPHAuMvk0am07IE8/vw...
	SOA Record	Serial 215 MNAME dns5demo.infoblox.com RNAME please_set_email Refresh 10800 Retry 1080 Expire 2592000 Negative Caching TTL 900
	NS Record	dns5demo.infoblox.com
	NSEC Record	900 dario.foo.example NS SOA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY
	DNSKEY Record	1296000 256 3 5 AwEAAcOSG/AFXc0jDn7CFXSXdLlSAJLPRmb...
	RRSIG Record	1296000 DNSKEY 5 2 1296000 20100311124305 2010030711535...
	RRSIG Record	1296000 DNSKEY 5 2 1296000 20100311124305 2010030711535...
	RRSIG Record	28800 NS 5 2 28800 20100311124305 20100307115358 61692 fo...
	RRSIG Record	900 NSEC 5 2 900 20100311124305 20100307115358 61692 foo...
	RRSIG Record	28800 SOA 5 2 28800 20100311125358 20100307115358 61692 f...



## Questions ?

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